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ABSTRACT 
 
Political protests in the form of strikes, locally known as hartal, remain quite common 
in the Indian subcontinent countries. Such a form of protests is associated with mass 
movement, intended to cause a total shutdown of economic activities and often results 
in coercion, violence, and damage to both public and private properties. Utilizing the 
World Bank Enterprise survey data of 2007 and 2013 of Bangladesh, this study 
examines the impacts of hartals on manufacturing firms. We find that political protests 
significantly increase costs for firms. Using flexible cost function based on factor 
analysis we see that the factor-neutral effect of strikes is positive and statistically 
significant, showing evidence of a reduction in firm productivity due to hartals. 
However, we did not find any evidence for systematic factor re-optimization by firms – 
in response to political strikes – suggesting that firms do not reallocate factor shares to 
tackle uncertain and irregular shocks like hartals.    
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1. Introduction: 
 
Substantial historical evidence shows that public protests, in the form of demonstration, 
are successful in promoting political changes. Occurrences of such events dated from 
the French Revolution to the anti-colonial movement against the British Raj in the 
Indian subcontinent, and to the recent incidents of the Arab Spring. While these events 
encompass various types of demonstration activities, political protests in the form of 
strikes are still quite common in the Indian subcontinent countries, a reflection of a 
legacy initiated through Mohandas K. Gandhi’s movement of civil disobedience against 
colonialism. Locally, this form of political protest is known as “hartal,” a term that 
originated from a Gujarati word meaning “closing down shops and warehouses” (Islam 
2005).2 The definition and execution of hartal has evolved from civil disobedience to a 
form of mass protest causing partial, or at times total, shutdown of economic activities. 
Though Gandhi’s non-cooperative movement involved strictly non-violent 
demonstrations of political protest,3 coercion, violence, and damage to both public and 
private properties frequently occurred during hartals since the 1930s and, especially in 
recent decades.4 
 Hartals have been instrumental in strengthening democratic progress in 
sub-continent during and after the anti-colonial struggles. However, even long after the 
post-colonial period had ended and democracy had been restored; hartals remain a 
prominent political culture for this part of the world. Along with Bangladesh, both India 
and Nepal still face a concerning number of hartals annually, and their occurrence has 
risen quite rapidly over the years (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). For example, Figure 1 
demonstrates the chronological incidents of hartals in Bangladesh from 1947 to 2013, 
indicating an ascending trend. In fact, after the 1990’s democratic system initiation in 
Bangladesh, the number of hartal days per year has dramatically increased, compared 
with those previously observed under autocratic regimes. In addition, the occurrence of 
hartals tends to rise significantly during pre-election years or regime shifts (CPD 2013). 
It appears that the opposition parties in Bangladesh, either out of desperation or 
strategic moves to regain political power, increasingly depend on this form of political 
protest to raise their voice when the parliament is non-functional and the oppositions are 
                                                   
2 Another word to express such political protests is “Bandhs.”   
3 For example, hunger strikes or boycotts. 
4 The current practice of observing a hartal day in Bangladesh is the following, opposition parties call for a 
protest on an issue, usually a day or two before the actual hartal day and circulate the announcement 
through press and electronic media. On the day of hartal, picketers and supports of the hartal occupy 
important streets and highways. Motorized vehicles and long-distance transportation are usually not 
under operation during a hartal day. Due to this transportation network breakdown, all sorts of economic 
activity slow down during a hartal day.  
3 
 
suppressed, both politically and economically. 
 The advocates of hartals claim this form of political protest as an exercise of 
their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly; however, exercising such 
a form of “freedom” can become costly for the economy (UNDP 2005). Hartals hinder 
the regular movement of general citizens and often associated with severe conflicts and 
violence that frequently cause injuries, coupled with damage to both public and private 
properties (see footnote 4 to get an overall understanding of a typical hartal day in 
Bangladesh). Hartals have wide-ranging effects: firms lose valuable working hours; 
factories miss labor days; poor people lose days’ worth of income; students miss 
classes; patients miss doctors’ appointments; shipments get delayed; meetings get 
postponed, and overall the economy misses its desired target. Though political parties 
often call hartals in the name of the people, in reality, hartals directly and indirectly 
impinge upon ordinary citizens, especially those belonging to the lower and 
lower-middle income brackets of the economy.5,6,7,8 
 The largest impact of hartals is the violence led loss of human lives as well as 
injuries and long-term suffering borne by the victims and their families; however, 
estimating such an impact in monetary term is nearly impossible. Besides these 
irreplaceable losses, hartals have significant negative aftermaths across the entire 
economy, such as increasing the price of necessary consumer goods. Sectors like 
transportation are prone to significant revenue loss owing to severe service disruptions 
and substantial damage to vehicular properties due to hartals, all of which lead to 
irregular and even missed payments for the workers. Hartals also affect the 
manufacturing sector, though indirectly, by increasing the cost of production (for 
example, increased input costs due to interrupted transportation links or using more 
night shifts on non-hartal days that increase labor costs and energy bills) or by 
decreasing the total production (due to missing labor inputs). Thus, hartals eventually 
have long-term adverse consequences on the entire business sector of the economy.  
 In response to hartals, firms have developed several strategies to recoup some 
of the losses, as noted in Khundker (2005). Commonly utilized strategies, especially by 
firms in retail, manufacturing, and service sectors, are operating on the weekends and 
extending operating hours on regular days. In general, wages are not cut due to hartals’ 
absences; however, firms also do not offer any extra payment for working on weekends 
                                                   
5 http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-261167 
6 http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-237167 
7 http://www.thedailystar.net/news/transport-owners-count-huge-losses 
8 http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-260928 
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or extended working hours on days of normal operation, to make-up for the loss due to 
hartals. Nevertheless, such coping strategies are inadequate to compensate for the losses 
incurred by the delay in shipments and using expensive modes of transportation, as well 
as loss due to supply chain interruption, postponement and damage of inventory, which 
lead to higher production cost. Moreover, in the case of prolonged and consecutive days 
of hartals, firms are unable to recover their losses using the typical coping strategies 
stated above.  
Numerous attempts have been made by business communities, international 
organizations, and think tanks to estimate the economic impact of hartals. These 
attempts range from using a holistic approach [converting GDP by total working days in 
a year and multiplying this by the total number of hartal days to find the loss of GDP, 
which is approximately 5% according to an estimate by the World Bank in 2001] to 
using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that estimates losses [employing 
CGE estimates, the loss due to hartals is 4.7% of GDP, (CPD 2013)].  
Two recent studies have evaluated the effect of hartals on firms more 
systematically than these earlier works. Ahsan and Iqbal (2015) paper looked into the 
exporting sector of Bangladesh and find that hartals leads to a reduction in firms 
exports by 4.5 percent. Ashraf et. al. (2015) paper, on the other hand, focused on a 
subset of large ready-made garment factories located in Dhaka and compared the effect 
of hartals with labour unrest by estimating the impact on labor productivity and 
absenteeism. Our study contributes to this literature by evaluating the impact of hartals 
on manufacturing firms in Bangladesh, especially employing a flexible cost function 
approach, to understand how firms manage these uncertain political shocks and whether 
they rearrange their factors of production, inspired by the study of Fisher et al. (2015), 
which explored the impacts of electricity scarcity on firms. If firms are unable to 
rearrange their factors share of the production process in response to strikes in the short 
run, they may have to experience high factor-neutral loss in productivity. Our study uses 
World Bank enterprise survey data of various years with regional variation of hartal 
occurrences – as the source of identification – for estimating the impact. To validate our 
result with the potential concern of endogeneity, we employed time- and 
division-specific shares of parliament seats held by the majority party as an instrument 
for our estimation. For robustness checks, we also ran size, type, and sector-specific 
regressions.  
 We find that the political protests in the form of hartals are costly for firms. 
Using factor analysis we see the factor-neutral effect of strikes is strongly positive and 
statistically significant, showing evidence of reduction of firm productivity due to 
hartals. However, we did not find any evidence for systematic factor re-optimization by 
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firms by substituting among factors inputs – in response to political strikes – suggesting 
that firms do not strategically reallocate factor shares to tackle uncertain and irregular 
shocks like hartals. Our sub-sample analysis, based on size, type, and industry specific 
regressions showed impact heterogeneity, where hartals reduce the use of labor and 
increase the energy and material cost-share of production for certain type of firms. One 
interpretation of this increase in the material cost share is a larger dependency on 
outsourcing or sub-contracting where instead of producing, firms move to buying 
intermediate goods, which leads to a rise of shadow or unregistered informal 
noncompliant factories, noticeably found in garments manufacturing sector in 
Bangladesh (Khundker 2005, Labowitz, S. and Baumann-Pauly, D. 2014, 2015).   
Our study is related to three strands of literature; firstly on the impact of labor 
protest or unrest on firms. The evidence from firm-level measures of output (and output 
per worker) is found to be deteriorated during the times of labor unrest (Katz, Kochan 
and Gobeille 1983; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Kleiner, Leonard and Pilarski 2002; 
Kruger and Mas 2004; and Mas 2008). Another strand of literature related to our study 
is the impact of political instability on economic outcomes (Aisen and Veiga 2011; 
Alesina et al. 1996; Alesina and Perotti 1993; Aisen and Veiga 2006; Svensson 1998; 
and Overland, Simons and Spagat 2005). The third strand of literature where this paper 
contributes is the effect of external shocks on firms’ performance (Advaryu et al. 2015, 
Alcott et al. 2016 and Ksoll et al. 2010).  
 The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background 
of political conflicts in Bangladesh and offers some discussion on previous literature 
examining the impact of political conflicts on state economic activity. Section 3 focuses 
on the methodology. Section 4 discusses the data used in the study. Section 5 
comprehensively discusses the estimations used in the study. Section 6 presents the 
various robustness checks of our estimations conducted in this study. Section 7 
concludes the study. 
  
2. Background 
 
Political unrest has been a cause of concern for many countries around the world, 
irrespective of their political regime or stage of development. Evidence from the 
literature examining this topic in many different countries suggests that political 
conflicts can have a significant detrimental impact on an economy. Indeed, domestic 
conflicts under certain conditions could push countries toward a “fragile state” status. 
Fragile and conflict-ridden countries lack the ability to develop mutually rewarding and 
constructive relationships within their societies and often suffer from a weak capacity to 
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undertake governance functions (OECD 2012). These countries are more vulnerable to 
internal and external shocks, and thus face the threat of instability. Arguably, given the 
informal sector’s dominance in economies such as Bangladesh, the adverse impact of 
hartals – a form of political unrest – could be lower when compared with more 
developed countries. 
 The legacy of hartal culture in Bangladesh has deep roots in regional history, 
and hartals are listed as “a constitutionally recognised political method for articulating 
any political demand” in the national Encyclopedia of Bangladesh (Banglapedia 2006). 
Political protests in the form of student movements, street demonstrations, and agitation 
were instrumental during the 1952 language movement against the former East Pakistan 
government who wanted to impose Urdu as the state language of Pakistan. This form of 
protest continued until 1958, when it was outlawed by the institution of martial law by 
the Ayub Khan regime, before being reinstated in the 1960s, albeit with limits. In 1969, 
a massive outbreak of mass movements against the authoritarian government, mostly in 
the form of political strikes and hartals, triggered the independence war of Bangladesh 
in 1971.  
Hartals continued to play a role even after the independence and have been 
associated with every important political event in Bangladesh (Rashiduzzaman 1997). 
Capitalizing on this legacy, unfortunately, and regrettably, all leading political parties 
have increasingly overused and abused hartal as a vehicle to demonstrate protest and to 
express demands. Consequently, this form of political practice, on most occasions, does 
not receive supports from the general public or the parties’ followers and devotees. 
Hence, to make these frequent and often unnecessary hartals effective, political parties 
often hire people, mostly those who are relatively young, poor, unemployed and want to 
make quick money. These “paid” hartal supporters occupy the major streets of the city 
and terrorize ordinary citizens and businesses with blockades, violence, and other forms 
of intimidation (such as inhibiting vehicular movement by picketing as well as bombing, 
burning, or damaging vehicles and public transportation, and so on).9,10 
As demonstrated in Figure 2, general strikes have become increasingly frequent 
over the years and have also been decentralized, as we observed large regional-level as 
well as nationwide general strikes (CPD 2013). Also, firms suffer transportation strikes, 
– both nationwide and regional – another form of politically motivated protest 
increasingly being used by the political parties. Firms typically suffer during a hartal 
day mainly due to the transportation interruption from blockades; these create supply 
                                                   
9 http://www.thedailystar.net/news/hartal-for-hartal-against 
10 http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-264163 
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shocks; production and distributional disruptions; and delay product deliveries (Hussain 
et al. 2014). In order to avoid being picketed, firms often ask their workers to come and 
leave the offices at late hours, or work extra hours on non-hartal days, which can 
increase labor costs due to overtime payments. This practice could also increase the 
energy costs of production due to working at nights, and shipment cost for using 
expensive modes of transportation like air-shipment to maintain commitment (Ahsan 
and Iqbal 2015).  
  
3. Methodology 
 
This section formally demonstrates the channels through which hartals could have an 
impact on firms, considering that this form of political protest creates constraints on 
firms’ capacity to produce. Let us assume that a hartals happens unpredictably, while 
firms need to continue and adjust their production. We demonstrate this situation as a 
firms’ problem in a standard cost function analysis.11 We assume that during the 
production process, a typical firm uses labor (L), capital (K), material (M), and energy 
(E) to produce output (Y). We assume that firms minimize their total cost of production 
under the regular condition (i.e., without hartals), which is expressed as 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑅 = 𝐶(𝑝𝐿 , 𝑝𝐾, 𝑝𝑀, 𝑝𝐸 , 𝑌). 
 
Suppose the probability of a hartals is 𝜃 > 0 and the occurrence of a hartals is 
denoted by H. Thus 𝜃  can capture the intensity of a hartal and the number of 
occurrences. The impact of hartals can be considered temporary, and firms consider this 
as a constraint on production. We can rewrite the constrained cost function with hartals 
as the following: 
 
𝑇𝐶𝐻 = 𝐶(𝑝𝐿 , 𝑝𝐾, 𝑝𝑀, 𝑝𝐸 , 𝑌, 𝐻). 
 
Since hartals can take several forms, including blockades of roads and transportation as 
well as violence, it can prevent workers from commuting to plants on time, delay 
shipments from intermediaries to plants, and delay delivery to the merchants or to ports. 
For simplicity, we assume two main channels of hartals’ impacts on firms’ total costs. 
The direct effect of a hartals lies in its interruption channel on the regular production 
                                                   
11 Having blackouts as unexpectable negative shocks for firms, Fisher-Vanden et al. 
(2013) examine the impacts and associated possible adjustments, such as outsourcing 
and self-generation of electricity. We follow their methodology based on cost function. 
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process, which leads to underutilization of capital, creates stocks of unused raw 
materials, and delays in shipments (which may push firms to opt for more expensive 
mode of transportation), which increase costs. The indirect effects of hartals are 
channelled through changes in factor prices. Both of these effects increase total costs of 
production and act as additional restrictions on firms’ cost minimization problem.  
Taking the log of cost function, the risk-neutral firm would expect the total cost 
function for producing a given amount ?̅? as the following: 
 
𝐸[ln𝑇𝐶(?̅?)] = 𝜃ln𝑇𝐶𝐻(?̅?) + (1 − 𝜃)ln𝑇𝐶𝑅(?̅?). 
 
As hartals increase costs by imposing constraints on firms, we expect to have 
∂E[ln𝑇𝐶(?̅?)]
∂θ
= ln𝑇𝐶𝐻(?̅?) − ln𝑇𝐶𝑅(?̅?) > 0. It is natural to assume that given higher factor 
prices, total costs are higher when hartals occur. From the indirect effects, the share of 
each factor would change. Based on Shephard’s Lemma, 
∂ln𝑇𝐶
∂ln𝑝𝑖
=
∂𝑇𝐶
∂𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑖
𝑇𝐶
 , such changes 
are expressed as 
∂si
∂θ
=
∂2ln𝑇𝐶
∂𝑝𝑖 ∂𝜃
=
∂ln𝑇𝐶𝐻
∂𝑝𝑖
−
∂ln𝑇𝐶𝑅
∂𝑝𝑖
 for 𝑖 ∈ [L, K, M and E]. 
where 𝑠𝑖 expresses the cost share of input i. The sign for each input i shows the relative 
increase in the factor’s share resulting from the occurrence of hartals. If firms are 
located in a region where a greater number of hartals have been observed, they may 
reduce their own production and purchase materials that reduce their labor, capital, and 
energy inputs. The above arguments are summarized in Figure 3, inspired by the study 
of Fisher-Vanden and Jefferson (2008). Without occurrence of a hartal, firms would 
choose the input share by factor prices at A under the budget constraint drawn by P𝐴P𝐴. 
With a hartal, the factor prices of firms increase. When they do not change their factor 
inputs, then to maintain the same level of production, the budget constraint shifts to 
PA′PA′, and it is shown as the shift to A′. This can be regarded as the factor-neutral 
effects of hartals. On the other hand, if firms adopt a different production strategy to 
cope with hartals, they may change their input share according to the changes in factor 
prices. For increased labor cost (employing workers for longer hours requires overtime 
payments) and energy cost (extended hours of work, especially later in the evening), 
firms may choose to increase material purchases and may opt for outsourcing or 
sub-contracting. Such behavior can be captured by the factor-biased effects of hartals, 
which affect the optimal combination of inputs. This change can be captured by a shift 
from AA′ to AB′. In sum, the impacts of hartals can be decomposed into factor-neutral 
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and factor-biased effects.  
 
[Figure 3 is about here] 
 
Finally, firms may reduce their output level (𝑌′̅ < ?̅?) compared to the level without 
hartals. This difference comes to the shift from B′ to B′′. From these theoretical 
underpinnings, we hypothesize the following two predictions: 
I. Decrease in productivity: We expect hartals will increase unit costs of 
production, due to the shock faced by firms with no immediate remedy to 
respond.  
II. Re-optimization: Firms may re-optimize their factor share of production inputs 
based on the response to hartals.  
4. Empirical Model  
 
4.1 Identification Strategy  
Identifying the impact of hartals is very difficult in Bangladesh where there 
hardly exists any scope for a counterfactual. One exception was in the year of 2007-08 
when the military-backed interim government took power and no hartal was observed, 
which makes it an ideal candidate to measure the impact using a natural experimental 
framework. However, the impact that could be measured from this exercise will be a 
combined effect of interim government and no-hartal occurrence effect, and isolating 
these two factors is extremely difficult.  
Instead of pursuing in that direction, the identification strategy employed in 
this study is the regional variation in hartal occurrences at the division level (see Figure 
2). Various studies have argued that the political culture of hartal has recently been 
decentralized, and we observe that more regional-level hartals are being organized by 
political parties compared with the old trend of nationwide hartals (see Khundker 2005 
and CPD 2014). A hartal can be called any day of the week12 by the opposition parties, 
hence it is usually hard to predict ex-ante. Reasons claimed by the opposition parties in 
calling for hartals have been quite erratic, as they range from issues such as 
imprisonment or police harassment of their leaders and followers to general price hikes 
due to tax increments, to government disallowing the holding of assemblies or 
demonstrations in the street, and so on. As a result, identifying political events that are 
more likely to trigger a call for a hartal by the opposition is very difficult. Although a 
                                                   
12 Typically hartals are not called on weekends and on national holidays. 
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systematic pattern might exist in the number of hartals occurrences before the 
immediate pre-election years (more occurrences) and after the election (fewer 
occurrences), the actual number of such events (and actual timing and duration of the 
event) remains difficult to predict ex-ante by firms. Hence, it is extremely tough, if not 
impossible, for firms to forecast the exact days and numbers of occurrences of future 
hartals events. Moreover, hartals are typically not announced well ahead of time to 
enable firms to adjust their production process. In most cases, hartals are announced 
just a day or two prior to their actual occurrences, forcing firms to take extreme 
measures or quick–fixes to cope with the situation.  
However, endogeneity issues may arise with our choice of hartal variable in 
the econometric setting. We defined the hartal variable as the number of days (or 
weeks) in which protests by opposition parties occurred in a year. Even though we 
captured regional, year, and industry classification-based fixed effects in the empirical 
analysis, unobserved characteristics of firms located in a particular region could impact 
the number of hartal observed in that location (for example, an influential local firm 
connected with political elites may promote protests), which could also influence the 
output and cost changes experienced by firms. To tackle this potential endogeneity issue, 
we introduced instrument variables (IV) that may capture the variations in regional 
occurrences of hartals but not directly affect the cost or output of firms located in that 
region. We employed time- and division-specific shares of seats held by the majority 
parties13 in the parliament, and its interaction with time and division dummies, as the 
set of instruments. Since hartal is predominantly a form of political protest and to 
conduct a successful hartal, one needs to have a strong political presence in the region, 
this set of IVs should strongly influence the number of hartal occurrences in the region, 
but not directly influence firms’ costs.  
A reasonable concern, although, could arise based on the validity of the 
exclusion restriction of our instrumental variable, as one could argue that a powerful 
ruling party, who has a dominant presence in the region and in the parliament, could 
carry out massive infrastructure development that might reduce costs for firms. To 
invalidate this concern, we checked the correlation of division-wise regional 
infrastructure development (proxied by kilometres of road construction) with share of 
parliamentary seats in the region by the ruling party (a reasonable proxy for political 
power in the region) for our survey years using the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
                                                   
13  Bangladesh has four major parties, namely Bangladesh Awami League (AL), 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jatiya Party and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami 
(BJI). However, for the last two decades, a two-party system is evolving as AL and BNP 
created two coalition of like-minded parties.        
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(BBS) national dataset. For our Enterprise survey dataset of 2007 from which we used 
the data of 2005-06, we checked the correlation of last parliamentary election result of 
2001 with infrastructure data of 2004 and found the correlation coefficient is 0.28 and 
statistically insignificant (see Figure 4a). Additionally, doing the same exercise for 2013 
Enterprise survey data (where the survey was done in 2012), by comparing 
parliamentary election result of 2008 with infrastructure development in 2011, the 
correlation coefficient found to be -0.32 and statistically insignificant (see Figure 4b). 
As depicted in Figure 4a and 4b, we do not see any clear or systematic pattern of the 
correlation, and if anything, the correlation is very weak. These exercises give us some 
confirmation that the identification strategy may not violate any fundamental properties 
of the instrumental variable approach in our estimation. 
 
4.2 Factor Analysis 
 
We specify the flexible translog cost function of firm f in industry k during year t in 
region r in response to a hartal as the following:  
ln𝑇𝐶𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑌ln𝑌𝑓𝑡 +
𝛾𝑌
2
(ln 𝑌𝑓𝑡)
2 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗ln𝑃𝑗𝑓𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 +    
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗ln𝑃𝑖𝑓𝑡ln𝑃𝑗𝑓𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐽
𝑖=1 +
                  ∑ 𝛽𝑌𝑗ln𝑌𝑓𝑡ln𝑃𝑗𝑓𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝛿0ln𝐻𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌ln𝐻𝑟𝑡ln𝑌𝑓𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗ln𝐻𝑟𝑡ln𝑃𝑗𝑓𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜂𝑘 +
                  𝜅𝑟 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑓𝑡.                                               (3) 
 
Here, 𝑇𝐶𝑓𝑡 and 𝑌𝑓𝑡 are the total production costs and the output of firm f at time t, 
respectively. 𝑃𝑗𝑓𝑡 is the firm- and time-specific factor price j (where j is labor, capital, 
material, or energy) and 𝐻𝑟𝑡 measures hartals in region r at time t. We also included 
dummies for industries (ηk), regions (κr), and years (μt). Here, the factor-neutral effect 
of hartals would be 𝛿0 and 𝛿𝑌, by permitting the factor-neutral effect to vary by 
output, whereas 𝛿𝑗 is the factor-bias effects of hartals. 
      From Shepard’s lemma, we could simultaneously estimate the share equation for 
each factor j as well, which is 
𝑆𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 +
1
2
∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑓𝑡
𝐽
𝑖=1 + 𝛿𝑗𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑌𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑓𝑡 + 𝜔𝑓𝑡.                     (4) 
 
Since equations (1) and (2) show a system of equations where the impact of hartals on 
factor shares are likely to be correlated with the translog cost equation, we need to use 
the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique to estimate such a model efficiently. 
To ensure that the coefficient shows typical properties, such as homogeneity and 
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symmetry, we imposed the following constraints on the function: 
 
𝛽𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗𝑖 , ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 = 1, ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝐽
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝛽𝑌𝑗
𝐽
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝛿𝑗 = 0
𝐽
𝑖=1 .                    (5) 
Our translog flexible cost function estimation technique had to deal with two 
potential endogeneity issues: one resulting from using the output as a regressor and the 
other concerning the number of hartal occurrences. Finding appropriate instruments to 
proxy for output or demand shifts is extremely difficult in the context of Bangladesh, 
which is a small country with an integrated population and economic activities. Due to 
data limitations, we employed imprecise proxy for output, namely firm profit which is a 
recognized practice in this literature (for example see Fisher-Vanden et al. 2015). 
Moreover, we control for industry, region, and year fixed effects to address some of the 
concerns regarding endogeneity issue related to output.  
In our regression estimates, we report estimations based on IVs, which is 
termed as IV-SUR regression throughout the paper.  
 
Marginal effects and aggregate effects of hartals 
To further examine the impacts of hartals, our specification enables us to obtain the 
marginal and average effects. Differentiating the equation to be estimated by the hartal 
variable, the marginal effects are written as 
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝑓𝑡
𝜕𝐻
=
𝑇𝐶𝑓𝑡
𝐻
[α0 + α1ln𝑄𝑓𝑡 + ∑ βj
J
j=1 ln𝑝𝑗𝑓𝑡].      (4) 
There are three components of the effects from hartals. One is the direct impact 
reflecting the increase in total costs in α0. Second is the increase in unit costs shown 
in α1. Third is the changes in factor input shares in βj. The first, two terms in the 
bracket are the factor-neutral effects and the last terms are the factor-biased effects in 
Figure 3. 
 
5. Data 
 
We use two nationally representative enterprise survey dataset on Bangladesh collected 
by the World Bank. The firms surveyed by the World Bank are not a random sample of 
entire manufacturing firms of Bangladesh. The dataset focused on medium and large 
firms in Bangladesh and hence the findings of the analysis are not generalizable for 
micro, small or cottage industries. The first survey was conducted in 2005–2006 (called 
“Enterprise survey 2007”) and the second in 2012 (called “Enterprise survey 2013”). 
The Enterprise survey 2007 data includes survey year data as well as retrospective data 
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of firms for the past several years, however, due to the susceptible nature of 
retrospective data, we are only using survey year data of 2005 and 2006. The 2013 
dataset, on the other hand, reports information for the 2012 survey year. We restrict our 
samples only for those manufacturing firms who do not have any missing information 
for input costs, sales, and regional location. In total, we have 1232 observations for 
manufacturing sector firms from six divisions of Bangladesh for three survey years 
(2005, 2006 and 2012), hence the dataset is repeated cross-sectional in nature.14 Since 
our main focus of the research is to see the impact of political protests on manufacturing 
firms, we used only the major manufacturing sectors in Bangladesh (namely Food, 
Garments, Leather, Textiles, and Chemicals) which represent 73.5% of the total 
manufacturing sector of Bangladesh (Shonchoy and Tsubota, 2014).15 The issue of 
sample selection, nevertheless, remains due to the limitation of the data we have from 
the Enterprise survey, which could make our estimates biased and sensitive; hence 
caution should be exercised in interpreting the results of this paper. Although main 
findings of the paper are convincingly robust using various measures of hartals and 
different sub-sample analysis, the sample selection issue, admittedly, remains an 
important caveat of this paper.  
The hartals dataset was compiled from newspaper archives, cross-verified 
using two leading newspapers of Bangladesh, Bangla daily the Prothom-Alo; and 
English daily The Daily Star. The national parliamentary election results have been 
compiled from statistical reports produced by the Bangladesh Election Commission. 
The summary statistics of hartals statistics and election results have been depicted in 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.  
The summary statistics of the factors of production and factor prices, which are 
mostly expenditure averages, are given in Table 3A. In our estimation, the price of 
labour (wage) is obtained by dividing a firm’s total wage bill with its number of 
permanent workers. The cost of fixed assets reported in the enterprise survey is used as 
the price of capital. The survey directly asked for information on material costs, and we 
convert this data to unit cost by dividing total sales to obtain the price of materials. 
Energy costs were also available in the survey. However, as the classifications of energy 
                                                   
14 This dataset also contains a small panel survey where observations come from only 122 
firms, and unfortunately, some key information from this study was missing from the 
panel version of the dataset, hence we could not use it. 
15 To obtain the classifications of industry and regional variations, we had to conduct some 
small re-classification because some classifications are limited to the respective enterprise 
survey (for example, there are 13 industrial classifications for the 2007 dataset but 27 
classifications for the 2012 dataset). To ensure comparability, we merge the finer 
classifications of 2012 to those of 2007.  
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and electricity slightly differ for each survey, we take the total of both as energy costs 
and obtain the price of energy by dividing their sum by total sales. Other expenses are 
subtracted from the total costs to make the sum of input share to be equal to one. In 
Table 3B, we have the cross-tabulation for industry classification and year of our 
sample. 
   
      [Table 1, 2A, 2B and 3 about here] 
 
6. Estimation 
 
6.1 Factor Analysis Regressions:  
 
Main Regression 
 
The results of factor analysis regressions are reported in Table 4 estimated with IV-SUR 
regressions. Columns (1) and (2) report our main specification of interest where hartal 
has been measured as a weekly occurrence (number of weeks firms faced interruption 
due to the strikes or hartals). In Column (1), we used the hartal measure as the general 
strikes, whereas in column (2) we used combined measures of general and 
transportation hartals. As a robustness check, in column (3) and (4), we used day-counts 
of hartal occurrences both for general and combined with transportation hartals, 
respectively. In our regression, we controlled for size and export classification, which is 
based on the number of permanent employees (firms with more than 100 employees are 
considered large firms) that each firm employs and whether the firm exports. In all 
regressions, we have controlled for industry fixed effects, regional fixed effects, time 
effects, factor prices, its squares, and the cross-factors interaction terms. All our 
estimations have the correct sign for various input price and quantity measures, which 
satisfies the properties of the factor analysis regression.  
Our results suggest that political strikes have positive impacts on the costs of 
production. The factor-neutral effect (𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑌 ) of strikes is positive and strongly 
statistically significant, reflected in the coefficient of the hartals alone, which means 
that interruption faced by the firms due to the general strikes or hartals is particularly 
costly for firms. This finding suggest that 1% increase in the hartal interruption faced 
by the firms increases total cost of production by about 1.17 percent (using the 
specification of column (2)). This finding is consistent throughout the different 
measures of hartal estimations (weekly, daily, general or combined with transportation 
strikes) which support the first hypothesis of our theoretical setting. However as a 
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conservative measure, we like to use the specification of hartal measures by week, as 
depicted in column (1) and (2), as our preferred specifications, as firms may take 
precautionary measure during the week (like working extra hours before or after the day 
of hartals). Therefore, week-specific measure of hartals seems more desirable for our 
estimation. Also, we emphasised combined strikes (a summation of transportation and 
general strikes) as our preferred estimations as regional transportation hartals also 
interrupts the transportation network of the country which has important implication for 
firms’ cost of production. Hence, for the rest of the paper, we present various 
regressions based on the specification of column (2) of Table 4. 
 Although our results indicate that the direct (factor-neutral) effect of hartal is 
quite substantial for manufacturing firms, we do not see any statistically significant 
evidence that firms manipulate their input factors (factor-bias effect) in response to 
strikes. We see some weak evidence that hartal leads to a decrease in the use of factor 
share of labour, but the magnitude of such an impact is quite small. Sign-wise, the 
factor input substitutions due to strikes have the expected properties, factor share of 
labour and capital interacted with hartal has negative sign whereas energy and material 
use has positive, however, none of the coefficients are statistically significant. This is 
not surprising as the political strike is one particular type of shock for firms (like labour 
unrest or protest), which is very difficult to predict ex-ante. Therefore, firms do not 
necessarily change their factor inputs systematically in response to unknown and 
irregular shocks like politically motivated strikes. This is also consistent with the paper 
of Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015) which finds that firms heavily re-optimize their factor 
inputs in response to electricity scarcity, which is a regular and anticipated shock for 
firms. The overall net effect of hartal on firms, however, would be a combination of 
factor-bias and factor-neutral effect, which we will explore at the end of this section.   
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Regression based on firm categorization 
 
 Table 5 reports the regressions of sub-samples constructed on firm-size 
classification – based on the specification used in column (2) and (4) of Table 4. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report the regression estimations for large firms whereas 
Columns (3) and (4) report small firms. Our results show that the factor neutral effect of 
strikes is statistically significant and positive for large firms whereas the effect is not 
statistically pronounced for the small firms, although the sign of the effect is positive. 
We also see a sizable and significant productivity loss for large firms; however for small 
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firms, the effect is not significant. In terms of factor-biased effects, we see a pattern 
similar to our main findings; that large firms hardly re-adjust their factor share of inputs 
in response to hartals. Interestingly, for small firms we see evidence for re-optimization, 
as small firms reduce their factor share from labour towards energy to cope with such 
political shocks. These findings indicate that for large production units, the direct effect 
of hartal is substantial, which leads to productivity loss as well as an increase in the cost 
of production, and large firms do not seem to have any re-adjustment mechanisms to 
absorb this shock. On the other hand, for small production units, such shocks get 
internalized by firms by short-run quick factor re-optimization. It appears that small 
firms substitute the labor share of production with energy, indicating that firms may 
operate for extra working hours (without providing extra-wage or compensation) to 
cover the loss of production.      
 [Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 6 reports our estimates for the impact of hartals on firm categorization based on 
production, targeted for domestic or international markets. Columns (1)-(2) report 
estimations using sub-sample data for exporting firms and columns (3)-(4) report for 
domestic firms. It is important to note that the factor-neutral effect of the strike is 
significant for both types of firm, which is consistent with the earlier findings of Ahsan 
and Iqbal (2015) who used transaction-level export data from Bangladesh and found 
that hartal increases the cost of production for export-oriented firms as these firms 
choose expensive means of shipments (like air-shipments) to meet delivery deadlines. 
The sign and magnitude of hartals effect on domestic-market oriented firms are also 
similar with export-oriented firms; however, the reason for such direct effect could be 
very different (may be due to supply bottleneck of inputs due to an interruption in the 
transportation network due to strikes). 
Now regarding factor-bias effects of political strikes, we see export-oriented 
firms significantly reduce the factor-share for labour inputs in response to hartal, and 
increase other input-shares, but none of these substitutions are statistically significant. 
However, for domestic-market oriented firms, we see two significant substitutions by 
firms, reduction for labour inputs and increase of energy inputs.   
 
                      [Table 6 about here] 
 
Industry Heterogeneity 
 
 Table 7 reports the industry-specific sub-sample regressions where columns (1) 
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- (4) report hartals measured as weeks of occurrence whereas columns (5)-(8) show 
days of occurrences, following the IV-SUR regression specification used in Table 3. Our 
regression results, using samples for each industry, are largely consistent with our 
previous findings of large factor-neutral effects of strikes on firms’ cost functions, 
which is statistically significant for food and textiles industries and weakly significant 
for garment industries. Our results suggest that food and textile industries face sizable 
productivity loss due to hartals. This finding is not surprising as both sectors depend on 
the smooth movement of supply chain inputs. Food industries use raw materials that are 
typically perishable in nature; and strikes cause such industries to face substantial direct 
cost due to transportation interruption. Similarly, textile industries face substantial direct 
cost due to hartals, which is also very difficult to avoid as the price of raw materials and 
shipment is severely affected during strike days (Islam at el. 2013).     
Interestingly the factor neutral effect of hartals is weakly significant for 
garment factories, one of the leading industrial and export sectors in Bangladesh (80% 
of Bangladeshi export come from the ready-made garments sector). This finding is 
consistent with the recent paper by Ashraf et al. (2015) where they collected detailed 
daily line operation information for the 33 large garment factories and found that 
productivity does not get affected by hartals for garment factories as reported 
absenteeism is very low on hartal days, because most of the workers live close to the 
factory facilities. Moreover, it appears that garment factories do respond to political 
strikes by re-optimizing their factor share: by substituting away labour with a material 
share of production. One obvious candidate for such increase in material costs is due to 
sub-contracting to sub-standard and noncompliant “shadow” factories for outsourcing 
some portion of production. In a series of influential research work by Liebowitz, S., 
and Baumann-Pauly, D. (2014, 2015) reveal this hidden practice of sourcing from 
informal “shadow” factories by the garment industries in Bangladesh which helps 
factories to cope with situations like political protests and also to make a profit. These 
shadow factories do not fulfil the basic requirements for compliance and the wage 
provided to their workers is below the standard of the industry, which enables these 
“shadow” factories to offer an attractive sub-contracting price below the cost of 
production in the originally assigned firms. With this practice, garment factories are still 
able to meet the deadlines and also make a profit. Padmanabhan et al. (2015) have a 
detail business case-study explaining this practice of sub-contracting in garment 
industries in Bangladesh.                              
Leather industries, on the other hand, appears more resilient to hartals as this 
industry does not face any significant productivity loss due to political strikes. This is 
partly due to the unregulated industrial environment and, cheap and available sources of 
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raw leather, which enables leather industry firms to maintain productivity even during 
the events of hartals. However, we see that leather factories re-optimize the factor of 
production in response to such a shock, making a substitution in favour of labour input 
share of and weekly reducing energy share. Our findings are largely consistent when 
using weekly or daily measures of hartals.  
 
 [Tables 7 about here] 
6.2 Aggregate effect:  
 
Table 8 reports the overall effect of hartals on production costs and offers a detailed 
breakdown of firms’ cost structures, using both week and day-based counts of hartals. 
The marginal effect estimations were obtained from Equation (4) by evaluating them at 
the sample mean. The sample average results suggest a substantial overall effect of 
hartals, consistent with our earlier findings, where hartal occurrences increase the total 
costs of production - as the factor-neutral effects surpass the cost-reducing factor-bias 
effects. The main contributor to the cost rise is the increase in the direct effect of hartals, 
which considerably increases firms’ cost of production. Our results suggest that these 
findings remain consistent in other specifications (not reported) based on sub-sample 
analysis of firm size and firm type. Overall, one additional hartal day in a year, than the 
average, leads to a rise of a factor neutral cost effect of 2.1 percent, of which only a 
mere 0.1 percent gets absorbed by firms by factor relocation leaving a hefty net increase 
in cost by 2%, on an average. To give a perspective, if a firm is located in Dhaka, which 
observed 6 more days of hartals in 2005 than the average, the total cost of production 
for this firm rose by 12% due to hartals. In other words, had the firm been located in 
Barishal in 2005, where the occurrences of hartals were 5 fewer days than the average, 
the firm would have saved 10% of the production cost which is due to a lower number 
of hartal occurrences in that region, holding all other things constant.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The World Bank Enterprise survey produced several reports on Bangladesh over the 
years and one key comparison in these documents was reported obstacles faced by the 
business owners of the survey firms (See Figure 5). In the 2007 survey, the biggest 
reported obstacle faced by firms was access to electricity. Noticeably, political 
instability was ranked as the third major impediment faced by the firms in 2007; 
however, in the 2013 survey, political instability was reported as the biggest obstacle 
faced by the firms. One obvious element of this political instability is the culture of 
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calling for strikes (hartals), which creates a considerable obstruction in day-to-day 
operations, as well as the business environment in Bangladesh.              
As pointed out by the business owners as well as reported in numerous articles 
in print and electronic media, we found that political protests in the form of hartal 
significantly increase costs for firms. Using factor analysis we see the factor-neutral 
effect of strikes is positive and strongly statistically significant, showing evidence of the 
reduction of firm productivity due to hartals. However, we find that firms do not 
necessarily re-optimize in response to political strikes by significantly substituting 
among factors inputs. We found some moderate evidence of factor re-optimization in 
response to hartals in sub-sample regressions, mostly in the direction of reduced use of 
labor and capital and increased the use of material and energy. One interpretation of the 
increase in the material cost share of production is outsourcing or sub-contracting, 
where firms shifts from “making” to “buying” intermediate goods from unregulated, 
noncompliant informal “shadow” factories; where the cost of procuring is profitable for 
firms. Our marginal calculation shows that one unit increase in hartals leads to a net 2% 
rise in the cost, on an average, from the mean. Overall, we find evidence that political 
strikes lead to a substantial rise in production costs that cannot be mitigated by the 
well-known coping strategies employed by the firms in Bangladesh.  
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Figure 1: Chronology of Hartals (1947 - 2013) 
 
 
Source: Dasgupta (2001); Imtiaz (2011); and compiled from various newspapers 
 
Figure 2: Number of General Hartals weeks (Regional and Countrywide) 
 
 
Source: Compiled from national English newspaper “The Daily Star” and “The Daily 
Prothom-alo” online archive. 
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Figure 3: Technology change and Hartals 
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Figure 4a: Correlation of infrastructure development in 2004 (division wise total 
road construction as a percentage of total) and share of parliamentary seats by the 
ruling party in 2001 (Correlation coefficient is 0.28)  
 
 
 
Figure 4b: Correlation of infrastructure development in 2011 (division wise total 
road construction as a percentage of total) and share of parliamentary seats by the 
ruling party 2009 (Correlation coefficient is -0.322)  
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Figure 5: Reported biggest obstacles of doing business in Bangladesh by business 
owners and top managers of surveyed firms in Bangladesh Enterprise Survey. 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled from World Bank Enterprise Survey Bangladesh Country Profile 
Report of 2007 and 2013.    
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Year Division
General Hartal 
days
General Hartal 
weeks
Combined Hartal days 
(General plus 
transportation hartals)
Combined Hartal 
weeks (General plus 
transportation hartals)
2005 Dhaka 31.5 15 41 20
2005 Chittagong 28 12 33 16
2005 Rajshahi 24 12 34 16
2005 Khulna 19 12 31 15
2005 Sylhet 24 12 27.5 14
2005 Barisal 19 11 23 13
2006 Dhaka 33.5 18 42 24
2006 Chittagong 31 17 38.5 22
2006 Rajshahi 29.5 19 37 23
2006 Khulna 29.5 18 35.5 22
2006 Sylhet 25 17 37.5 23
2006 Barisal 24 14 32.5 19
2012 Dhaka 22 8 29 13
2012 Chittagong 26.5 12 46.5 20
2012 Rajshahi 27 12 51 20
2012 Khulna 20 7 55 18
2012 Sylhet 23 9 30.5 13
2012 Barisal 20 7 32.5 12
Table 1: Summary of Hartal Statisitcs
Election Statistics Year Rajshahi Khulna Barisal Dhaka Sylhet Chittagong Total
Number of seats 2001 72 37 23 90 19 59 300
Number of seats by majority party 2001 48 29 20 56 10 53 216
Number of votes 2001 14947934 7421180 3235950 17233630 3385751 9512180 55736625
Number of votes to majority party 2001 6525339 3580869 1691955 7390895 1356431 5293810 25839299
Share of seats by majority party 2001 0.66666667 0.78378378 0.8695652 0.6222222 0.5263158 0.89830508 0.72
Share of votes to majority party 2001 0.43653785 0.48252017 0.5228619 0.4288647 0.4006293 0.55652963 0.46359641
Number of seats 2008 72 36 21 94 19 58 300
Number of seats by majority party 2008 63 33 18 93 19 37 263
Number of votes 2008 18191623 8541684 4001711 22193190 4296820 12405239 69630267
Number of votes to majority party 2008 10575870 4563650 2170600 13591910 2572194 6047142 39521366
Share of seats by majority party 2008 0.875 0.91666667 0.8571429 0.9893617 1 0.63793103 0.87666667
Share of votes to majority party 2008 0.58135934 0.53427989 0.542418 0.6124361 0.5986274 0.48746679 0.56758889
Table 2: Summury statistics of Parlimentary election on Bangladesh
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Costs (in BDT) 1232 161000000 523000000 118000 8840000000
Profit  (in BDT) 1232 44600000 145000000 13000 1850000000
Sales (in BDT) 1232 206000000 623000000 133000 9740000000
Price of Labour (in BDT) 1232 65776.73 112512 1333.333 2666667
Price of Capital (in BDT) 1232 2718368 12800000 900 300000000
Price of Energy (in BDT/sales) 1232 0.0330643 0.0402366 0.0003148 0.3505
Price of Material (in BDT/sales) 1232 0.5444198 0.2031375 0.0017973 0.9833333
Value share of Labour 1232 0.2256925 0.1644768 0.0016848 0.931522
Value share of Capital 1232 0.0423456 0.0601374 0.0001146 0.6242197
Value share of Energy 1232 0.0451649 0.0574166 0.000337 0.5740741
Value share of Materials 1232 0.686797 0.2054642 0.0111288 0.9952534
Large firm dummy 1232 0.4732143 0.4994848 0 1
Export firm dummy 1232 0.4715909 0.499395 0 1
Industry 2005 2006 2012 Total
Food 30 92 80 202
Garments 89 187 148 424
Leather 18 152 75 245
Textiles 36 72 116 224
Chemicals and Others 21 76 40 137
Total 194 579 459 1232
Table 3A: Summary Statistics
Table 3B: Cross Tabulation of Industry and Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: 
Log of total cost
General 
hartals
General and 
trasnportation 
hartals
General 
hartals
General and 
trasnportation 
hartals
Weeks Weeks Days Days
ln(Profit, Q) 0.830*** 0.840*** 0.976*** 0.849***
(0.103) (0.098) (0.191) (0.096)
ln(Wage, PL) 0.580*** 0.618*** 0.806*** 0.626***
(0.116) (0.109) (0.222) (0.105)
ln(Price of Capital, PK) 0.232*** 0.138** 0.242** 0.106**
(0.057) (0.054) (0.109) (0.053)
ln(Price of Energy, PE) 0.0969** 0.100** 0.00294 0.101**
(0.045) (0.043) (0.085) (0.042)
ln(Price of Materials, PM) 0.0908 0.143 -0.0508 0.168
(0.125) (0.117) (0.236) (0.113)
Large firm dummy 0.189 0.137 0.171 0.115
(0.217) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216)
Export firm dummy 0.498** 0.541** 0.527** 0.564***
(0.214) (0.214) (0.214) (0.214)
ln(No of Hartal, H) 1.595** 1.167** 2.727*** 0.854**
(0.621) (0.521) (0.950) (0.399)
ln(Q)*ln(H ) -0.0315 -0.0298 -0.0658 -0.0258
(0.034) (0.029) (0.054) (0.023)
ln(PL)*ln (H ) -0.0522 -0.0617* -0.105* -0.0529**
(0.039) (0.033) (0.063) (0.026)
ln(PK)*ln (H ) -0.0279 0.00468 -0.0250 0.0121
(0.019) (0.016) (0.030) (0.013)
ln(PE)*ln (H ) 0.0207 0.0182 0.0432* 0.0149
(0.014) (0.012) (0.023) (0.010)
ln(PM)*ln (H ) 0.0593 0.0389 0.0870 0.0259
(0.041) (0.035) (0.066) (0.027)
No. of  Observations 1232 1232 1232 1232
Control for Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4: The cost of strikes on Manufacturing firms (all results for main specification)
Note: Estimations are done based on Seemingly-unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. Estimatios of 
Column (1) and (3) are based on the number of division specific days of general/ political hartals and in 
column (2) and (4) are combined hartals which includes division specifiq general and transportation 
strikes. We used share of seats held by majority party and the inteaction of this variables with region 
and year as instruments. Robust standard errors are reported in the bracket. We denote significance at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks Days Weeks Days
ln(No of Hartal, H) 2.095** 1.942*** 1.206 0.709
(0.903) (0.746) (0.816) (0.589)
ln(Q)*ln(H) -0.113** -0.109*** -0.00504 0.00413
(0.049) (0.041) (0.053) (0.038)
ln(PL)*ln (H) -0.0497 -0.0492 -0.0900* -0.0665*
(0.045) (0.037) (0.048) (0.035)
ln(PK)*ln (H) 0.0303 0.0334* -0.00942 -0.000793
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.016)
ln(PE)*ln (H) 0.00289 0.00393 0.0429** 0.0304**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013)
ln(PM)*ln (H) 0.0165 0.0119 0.0566 0.0369
(0.049) (0.040) (0.049) (0.036)
No. of  Observations 583 583 649 649
Control for Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5: The cost of strikes on Firms, based on size (with General and Transportation 
hartals)
Note: Estimations are done based on Seemingly-unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. Estimatios of 
Column (1) and (3) are based on the number of division specific days of general/ political hartals and in 
column (2) and (4) are combined hartals which includes division specifiq general and transportation 
strikes. We used share of seats held by majority party and the inteaction of this variables with region 
and year as instruments. Robust standard errors are reported in the bracket. We denote significance at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.  
Large Firms Small FirmsDependent Variable: 
Log of total cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks Days Weeks Days
ln(No of Hartal weeks, H) 1.833** 1.910*** 2.058*** 1.311**
(0.830) (0.698) (0.791) (0.578)
ln(Q)*ln(H ) -0.0520 -0.0686* -0.0558 -0.0386
(0.042) (0.036) (0.050) (0.037)
ln(PL)*ln (H ) -0.0922** -0.0792** -0.109** -0.0730**
(0.042) (0.035) (0.049) (0.036)
ln(PK)*ln (H ) 0.00723 0.0112 0.00194 0.00725
(0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.017)
ln(PE)*ln (H ) 0.0211 0.0200 0.0404** 0.0269**
(0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013)
ln(PM)*ln (H ) 0.0638 0.0480 0.0666 0.0389
(0.047) (0.039) (0.052) (0.038)
No. of  Observations 581 581 651 651
Control for Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6: The cost of strikes on Firms, based on type (with General and Transportation 
hartals)
Export Oriented Firms Domestic Firms
Note: Estimations are done based on Seemingly-unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. Estimatios of 
Column (1) and (3) are based on the number of division specific days of general/ political hartals and 
in column (2) and (4) are combined hartals which includes division specifiq general and 
transportation strikes. We used share of seats held by majority party and the inteaction of this 
variables with region and year as instruments. Robust standard errors are reported in the bracket. 
We denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.  
Dependent Variable: 
Log of total cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Food Garment Leather Textile Food Garment Leather Textile
ln(No of Hartal, H) 3.870*** 2.045* 0.271 5.336*** 2.601*** 1.888* 0.140 4.343***
(1.359) (1.170) (1.955) (1.700) (0.970) (1.062) (1.757) (1.247)
ln(Q)*ln(H ) -0.251*** -0.0256 -0.185 -0.258** -0.194*** -0.0242 -0.160 -0.210***
(0.081) (0.060) (0.116) (0.102) (0.056) (0.054) (0.104) (0.075)
ln(PL)*ln (H ) -0.0191 -0.149** 0.240** -0.0931 0.00349 -0.136** 0.218** -0.0949
(0.090) (0.061) (0.095) (0.086) (0.063) (0.055) (0.086) (0.061)
ln(PK)*ln (H ) 0.0129 -0.0153 -0.0306 -0.00886 0.0176 -0.0138 -0.0274 0.00480
(0.045) (0.025) (0.051) (0.037) (0.031) (0.023) (0.046) (0.027)
ln(PE)*ln (H ) 0.0180 0.0173 -0.0594* 0.0265 0.0108 0.0161 -0.0545* 0.0213
(0.031) (0.020) (0.032) (0.027) (0.022) (0.018) (0.029) (0.019)
ln(PM)*ln (H ) -0.0117 0.147** -0.150 0.0755 -0.0318 0.134** -0.136 0.0688
(0.095) (0.064) (0.099) (0.081) (0.066) (0.058) (0.089) (0.058)
No. of  Observations 202 424 245 224 202 424 245 224
Control for Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export status dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Days
Note: Estimations are done based on Seemingly-unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. We used share of seats held by majority party and the inteaction of this 
variables with region and year as instruments. Robust standard errors are reported in the bracket. We denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) 
levels.  
Table 7: The cost of strikes on Firms, by industry classification (with General and Transportation hartals)
Dependent Variable: 
Log of total cost
Weekly hartal Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf . Interval]
Overall effects 8704550 3827705 2.27 0.023 1202386 16200000.00
Factor-Neutral 8940339 3948202 2.26 0.024 1202005 16700000.00
        Direct effects 9136462 4078396 2.24 0.025 1142953 17100000.00
        Outputs -196123.5 208584.4 -0.94 0.347 -604941.4 212694.4
Factor-Biased -235788.6 206137.4 -1.14 0.253 -639810.5 168233.2
        Labour -298753.3 210156.8 -1.42 0.155 -710653.1 113146.5
        Capital 5061.443 15644.86 0.32 0.746 -25601.93 35724.81
        Energy 14272.94 5130.112 2.78 0.005 4218.104 24327.77
        Materials 43630.29 16580.8 2.63 0.009 11132.52 76128.05
Daily hartal Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf . Interval]
Overall effects 3319875 1542742 2.15 0.031 296157 6343593
Factor-Neutral 3426979 1588658 2.16 0.031 313266.3 6540691
        Direct effects 3517298 1643230 2.14 0.032 296627.3 6737969
        Outputs -90319.45 87918.65 -1.03 0.304 -262636.8 81997.95
Factor-Biased -107104 81613.72 -1.31 0.189 -267064 52855.94
        Labour -136409.1 88172.76 -1.55 0.122 -309224.6 36406.31
        Capital 5280.315 3357.111 1.57 0.116 -1299.502 11860.13
        Energy 6150.937 2140.38 2.87 0.004 1955.869 10346
        Materials 17873.86 9587.506 1.86 0.062 -917.3044 36665.03
Table 8: Impacts of hartal at sample mean
